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Is the Labor Market to Blame?
monazza aslam
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I. Introduction
While Pakistan’s large and persistent gender gaps in education are well doc-
umented, explaining their existence and obstinacy has proven more difficult.
This article tests one—the labor market—explanation for gender gaps in
education in Pakistan.1 On the basis of the investment motive, it contends
that if the labor market rewards men’s schooling more than women’s or if it
more generally discriminates between the two genders, parents may have an
incentive to invest more in boys’ education. In this study, I test whether the
rewards to females are less than those to males in Pakistan’s labor market,
that is, whether the return to educating females is lower than that for men.
I also ask more generally whether there is wider gender-differentiated treatment
in the labor market, that is, whether much or all of the gender gap in earnings
is explained by measurable differences in male and female characteristics.
Private economic returns to schooling attainment are estimated using
Mincer’s semilogarithmic approach in a regression linking individual earnings
with additional years (or levels) of schooling completed (Mincer 1974). As is
well known, establishing a causal relationship between education and earnings
is problematic. Among the issues to contend with are biases due to omitted
I would like to thank Geeta Kingdon for the ideas, discussions, comments, and suggestions that
resulted in this article. This article has also substantially benefited from comments by Harold
Alderman, John Knight, Francis Teal, Jim Malcomson, Margaret Stevens, Mary Gregory, and the
participants of the Labour Economics Seminar, University of Oxford. I would also like to thank
Christopher Colclough and Marcel Fafchamps as well as the participants of the United Kingdom
Forum for International Education and Training conference (2005) at Oxford for helpful suggestions.
Funding from the Department for International Development’s Research Consortium on Education
Outcomes and Poverty is gratefully acknowledged. Any errors are mine.
1 Alternative explanations of gender-differentiated parental treatment are that (a) there are pure
preferences for sons and (b) the returns accruing to parents from daughters’ education are lower
than those accruing from sons’ education (maybe because a daughter’s in-laws reap the benefits of
her education upon marriage) and economic necessity (or parental selfishness) potentially increases
the likelihood that boys are sent to school compared to girls. However, Alderman and King (1998)
note that it is difficult to distinguish empirically between these various explanations.
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variables, measurement error in reported schooling, distinguishing between
homogeneous and heterogeneous returns to education, and selection into wage
employment. Moreover, while human capital theory hypothesizes a concave
education-earnings profile and diminishing returns to human capital produc-
tion, empirical evidence from various countries has challenged the prevailing
view (see Behrman and Wolfe [1984] and Alderman and Sahn [1988] and
more recently Ashraf and Ashraf [1993a, 1993b], Kingdon [1998], Kingdon
and Unni [2001], Belzil and Hansen [2002], Duraisamy [2002], Nasir [2002],
and So¨derbom et al. [2004]). This finding raises serious policy concerns and
warrants further investigation. Among the policy considerations, key is that
primary school completion may not be sufficient for poverty reduction since
the poor would need to attain higher education levels to allow them to climb
out of poverty. Also, while on the one hand high returns to higher education
levels may mitigate the need for subsidizing higher education, on the other
hand, there still may be need for subsidizing higher education for the poor
who face credit constraints that prevent them from accessing these education
levels.
Despite these concerns, Mincerian returns remain popular and have been
widely estimated (see Psacharopoulos 1994; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos
2004). Estimates of private returns to schooling, though available for Pakistan,
are mostly dated and are often constrained by data (Hamdani 1977; Haque
1977; Guisinger, Henderson, and Scully 1984; Khan and Irfan 1985; Shabbir
1991, 1994; Shabbir and Khan 1991; Ashraf and Ashraf 1993a, 1993b; Nasir
1998, 1999, 2002; Siddiqui and Siddiqui 1998; Asadullah 2005; Riboud,
Savchenko, and Tan 2006). There are two consistent findings from past studies
in Pakistan: (i) returns to schooling attainment are low as compared to other
developing countries and (ii) returns increase with the level of education. The
latter finding challenges the dominant view that the earnings function is
concave, and I provide evidence to suggest that in fact economic returns to
schooling are quite substantial for both men and women.
The estimation of returns to schooling by gender has received less attention
in the literature partly because in many countries gender differences are not
so large. When estimates are available, the evidence from developing countries
is mixed. While some studies find that returns to schooling do not differ
significantly by gender (Behrman and Wolfe 1984; Schultz 1993), others
discover lower returns to women’s schooling (Kingdon 1998) or higher returns
(Behrman and Deolalikar 1995; Asadullah 2006). Previous studies in Pakistan
mostly compute returns to schooling attainment for males only and, hence,
are not able to answer the central question addressed in this study: Does the
labor market explain lower female schooling in Pakistan? Two recent exceptions
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are Nasir (2002) and Riboud et al. (2006). While Nasir implies that the
answer to this question is “yes,” Riboud et al. find higher returns to women’s
schooling, suggesting otherwise. These contradictory findings generate a puzzle
in the literature. However, as neither of these studies addresses various meth-
odological problems, their estimates could be biased, raising some uncertainty
about their findings.
The objective of this article is to estimate returns to schooling attainment
by gender in a consistent manner to determine whether childhood and ado-
lescent education investments are affected by how the labor market rewards
adult education. Both one-factor and multiple-factor models are used (Blundell,
Dearden, and Sianesi 2005). In the former, education is defined as a continuous
variable (completed grades of schooling attainment). This is a restrictive spec-
ification since it assumes that the return to schooling is the same for different
attainment levels. The alternative model (multiple factor) specifies education
in level form: each level is allowed to have a different effect on earnings. This
is clearly more flexible than a quadratic specification that includes education
in years and its square (Blundell et al. 2005). Briefly, four main methods of
estimation are utilized: (i) standard ordinary least squares (OLS); (ii) the Heck-
man two-step procedure, which deals with the sample selectivity issues that
arise because earnings are observed only for individuals who participate in the
waged labor force and who may therefore form a nonrandom subsample of
the population; (iii) two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates using family
background measures (parental education and spouse’s education) as instru-
mental variables for schooling, to deal with endogeneity and measurement
error in schooling; and (iv) household fixed-effects estimation to control for
unobserved family-specific heterogeneity. For this, estimates are based on
spouse pairs, sibling pairs, and parent-child pairs. In all four methods I allow
for the possibility that parameters differ between the two genders by estimating
separate earnings functions by gender.2 Latest nationally representative data
from the 2002 Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS) are used for the
analysis.
The article is structured as follows. Section II discusses the empirical strat-
egy, and Section III discusses the data. Section IV analyzes the empirical
findings, and Section V presents conclusions.
2 In this study I am unable to deal with measurement error (except when using the instrumental
variable method), and although I am able to sign the bias (downward) given the assumption that
the error is classical in nature, its magnitude remains unquantified.
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II. Empirical Strategy
This study adopts the standard Mincerian approach of estimating earnings
functions to compute rates of returns to education by gender. The earnings-
schooling relationship can be stated in the form of a semilogarithmic rela-
tionship as follows:
ln Yp b  b S  b X  b X   , (1a)i 0 1 i 2 1i 3 2 i
S p g  gX  g X  m . (1b)i 0 1 3i 2 4 i
In (1a), is the log of earnings3 of individual i, measures years ofln Y Si i
completed schooling in a one-factor model (or levels of schooling with dummy
variables representing various levels of completed schooling in multiple-factor
models), is a vector of observed characteristics of individual i, is aX X1i 2
vector of observed characteristics of the family, and i is the individual-specific
error. Equation (1b) models determinants of schooling, where is a vectorX3i
of observed characteristics of individual i, is a vector of household-levelX4
covariates, and mi is a residual term. The coefficient on schooling, b1, measures
the rate of return to each additional year of schooling (or to a particular level
of schooling). This formulation assumes that the rate of return estimate is
“homogeneous,” that is, identical across all individuals i.
I start by estimating OLS models of earnings functions on male and female
wage earners to provide some baseline results. However, OLS estimates of
earnings functions potentially suffer from sample selectivity, omitted variables,
and measurement error biases. On the first, earnings are observed only for
individuals participating in the paid labor force. Moreover, most studies focus
on waged workers, whereas many individuals in developing countries, espe-
cially men, are self-employed rather than in waged work. Consequently, es-
timates of returns to education of wage workers are on a potentially nonrandom
draw from the population, resulting in sample selection. In most applied work,
Heckman’s correction for sample selectivity is used. This entails estimating a
waged work participation equation, and the predicted probabilities of waged
work from this equation are used to derive the selectivity term l, which is
then included in the main earnings function, such as (1a). To identify l, the
participation equation must include exclusion restrictions that are not part of
the vector X in (1a).
The second problem has to do with omitted variable bias. The coefficient
on schooling in the earnings function can be interpreted as the causal effect
3 Wage rates are a better measure of labor productivity since earnings incorporate labor supply
decisions and a return to capital. Lack of data on wage rates often prompts the use of earnings.
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of education on earnings only if earnings differentials between individuals with
varying years of schooling do not reflect differences in unobserved ability (or
other unobserved investments in human capital) that happen to be correlated
with education. For instance, unobserved inherent ability is clearly a deter-
minant of schooling attainment as well as of earnings and generates endo-
geneity of schooling in the earnings function yielding inconsistent estimates
of returns to schooling.
Finally, when measurement error (ME) is of the classical variety in the
schooling variable , it generates a correlation between the error terms in theSi
earnings and schooling functions inducing attenuation bias in the regression
coefficient b1. This problem is compounded in sibling studies since differencing
within families reduces the true signal-to-noise ratio in schooling.
Various methods have been used in extant literature to address school en-
dogeneity in an earnings function framework. The instrumental variables (IV)
methodology identifies variables (instruments, ) that are correlated withWi
schooling ( ) and uncorrelated with unobserved ability and measurement er-Si
rors. This method provides a solution to endogeneity with the advantage that
it simultaneously addresses ME issues. The key challenge is finding suitable
instruments, that is, , that are not part of the vectors X in equation (1a).Wi
Social and natural experiments are useful, and many studies using “institutional
variations” in schooling due to such factors as proximity to schools, minimum
school-leaving age, and so forth have been used to instrument for schooling.
Card (1995a, 1999, 2001) provides a summary of some of the recent studies
that use this approach, which include Angrist and Krueger (1991), Butcher
and Case (1994), Card (1995b), and Harmon and Walker (1995), among others.
The consensus from contemporary research on developed countries is that IV
estimates based on natural experiments are as high as and sometimes almost
20% higher than corresponding OLS estimates (Card 2001). The evidence
from developing countries is mixed and inconclusive (see Strauss and Thomas
[1995] for a review and Maluccio [1998] and Duflo [2001] for returns to
education estimates using institutional variation for the Philippines and
Indonesia).
However, natural experiment–based IV approaches have exacting data de-
mands, and an alternative is to use nonexperimental IVs for endogenous school-
ing. As children’s schooling outcomes are to a large extent driven by family
background (FB), variables such as father’s education and mother’s education
are sometimes used (Trostel, Walker, and Woolley [2002] and So¨derbom et
al. [2004] are examples of two recent studies). FB variables constitute valid
instruments if they affect earnings only indirectly through their effect on
schooling, that is, if there is no intergenerational transmission of ability. FB
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then enters the vector of variables in equation (1b), which directly influence
schooling.4 However, a number of recent studies call into question the as-
sumption of no intergenerational transmission of ability (see Behrman and
Rosenzweig 2002, 2005; Plug and Vijverberg 2003; Plug 2004; Black, Dev-
ereux, and Salvanes 2005; Behrman et al. 2006; Bjo¨rklund, Lindahl, and Plug
2006; De Haan and Plug 2006).
Alternatively, a number of studies use FB directly in earnings functions on
the grounds that FB proxies omitted ability, school quality, and out-of-school
learning environment or reflects nepotistic family connections (see Heckman
and Hotz [1989] in Panama, Lam and Schoeni [1993] in Brazil, Krishnan
[1996] in Ethiopia, and Kingdon [1998] in India). However, Card (1999,
1825) is critical of the use of FB variables as controls in earnings functions:
inclusion of FB in earnings functions may reduce the bias but will still yield
an upward-biased estimate of rates of return unless all the unobserved com-
ponents are completely absorbed in the FB variables (1825–26).
An alternative to the IV technique is to use either repeated observations
on the same individual over time or observations from different individuals
within the same family to “difference out” the variables generating correlation
in the residuals in a “household fixed effects” approach. Arguably, a good part
of the unobserved heterogeneity is common to family members. Consequently,
differences in unobserved ability and their impact in determining education
should be lower within rather than between families. Earnings functions can be
estimated on twin samples, siblings, father-son, or mother-daughter pairs using
a household fixed effects or first-differencing approach. By introducing sub-
samples of households with at least two individuals of a given gender in wage
employment (and more stringently households with brothers/sisters, father-
son, or mother-daughter pairs in wage employment), the household fixed effects
method effectively controls for all household variables that are common across
these individuals within a given household. A simultaneous advantage of the
household fixed effects procedure is that it controls for selection that is based
on additive observables and unobservables (Pitt and Rosenzweig 1990, 978;
Behrman and Deolalikar 1995, 106). However, there is some evidence that
individual-specific endowments account for a substantial share of earnings
variance even after controlling for household-specific endowments (Behrman,
Rosenzweig, and Taubman 1994).
Card (1999) provides an excellent summary of findings from twin and
sibling studies in developed countries. In almost all instances, household fixed-
4 Such that if individual ability is an unobservable in the error term in earnings functions ( ),i
family background instruments ( ) must not be correlated with the error, i.e., .Z Corr(Z ,  )p 0i i i
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TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF THE LABOR FORCE IN PAKISTAN BY GENDER (15–65)
Labor Force Status
Male Female Total
N % N % N %
Unemployed (seeking
work) (a) 962 3.51 949 3.23 1,911 3.37
Employed ( )bp cd 23,095 84.34 6,800 23.14 29,895 52.80
Self-employed (c) 11,594 42.34 4,782 16.27 16,376 28.85
Wage employed (d) 11,501 42.00 2,018 6.87 13,519 23.81
Total labor force (ep
)ab 24,057 87.85 7,749 26.37 31,806 56.02
Out of labor force (f ) 3,328 12.15 21,638 73.63 24,966 43.98
All persons ( )gp e f 27,385 100 29,387 100 56,772 100
Note. Calculated from the 2002 PIHS. The definition of unemployed includes everyone reporting being
jobless but seeking work; self-employed includes all defined as employers employing individuals, unpaid
family workers, owner-cultivators, sharecroppers, cultivators, and livestock owners; wage employed in-
cludes all defined as paid employees; and non–labor force participants (out of labor force) are those
reported as jobless and not seeking work.
effects estimates of the return to education are smaller than naive OLS esti-
mates, suggesting an upward bias in the latter. However, data differencing
exacerbates ME problems in sibling studies as part of the true signal is dif-
ferenced out within families and the return to education is biased toward zero
(Griliches 1979). The finding of smaller estimated returns in sibling studies
gives credence to the suspicion that these studies suffer potentially severe
attenuation bias. However, research in recent years overcomes measurement
error problems, and while a majority of studies conclude that fixed-effects
estimates corrected for measurement error are still smaller than OLS estimates
(Ashenfelter and Rouse 1998; Rouse 1999; Hertz 2003), a study on a sample
of twins by Behrman and Rosenzweig (1999) concludes otherwise.
III. Data and Variable Speciﬁcation
The 2002 PIHS, a nationally representative data set on more than 16,000
households across Pakistan, is used in the analysis. Information, using a house-
hold questionnaire, was collected on employment and earnings of all males
and females aged 10 and above. I restrict the analysis to adults aged 15–65
reporting waged work employment. Consistent with previous literature, full-
time students (currently enrolled in school) are excluded from the sample.
This yields a total of 13,519 adult males and females aged 15–65 reporting
participation in waged employment.
Table 1 shows the distribution of the labor force by gender in Pakistan.
There are striking gender differences in labor force participation rates: whereas
88% of males participate in the labor force, only 26% of females do so. A
relatively large proportion of males and females are engaged in self-employ-
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ment: 42% and 16%, respectively. Gender differences in waged work partic-
ipation are particularly striking: 42% of males and only 7% of females are
engaged in some form of waged employment.
Earnings functions are fitted on the subsample of waged workers, that is,
11,501 males and 2,018 females. Selectivity-corrected earnings functions are
fitted on wage work participants, with the reference category (or nonpartici-
pants) including all other individuals (i.e., the unemployed, the self-employed,
and nonworkers). The IV estimates are based on subsamples of waged workers
who (1) report information on parental education and (2) are married and
report spouse’s education. Finally, the household fixed effects methodology
estimates earnings functions on subsamples of households in which at least
one individual of each gender (male/female) is in waged employment (any
relation, sibling pairs, or father-son/mother-daughter pairs).
The dependent variable in the participation equation is wage or salaried
employment (PAID_EMPLOY) and that in the earnings functions is the natural
log of monthly earnings (LN_MONTHLY_Y). The definitions of the variables
used in the participation equation and earnings functions are given in table 2.
The vector of exclusion restrictions in the work participation equation includes
demographic variables (CHILD7, ADULT60, MARRIED, HEAD) and the nat-
ural log of unearned household income (LNUNEARNED_Y).
The earnings functions include potential experience and its quadratic (EXP
and EXP2). This variable is often computed as age  years of schooling 
5 on the belief that individuals start schooling at the age of 5 and enter the
labor market upon completing schooling. The PIHS, however, asks individuals
who attended formal schooling the age at which they entered school. Therefore,
for individuals with positive years of schooling, EXP is computed as age 
completed grades of schooling attainment  age entered school. However, for
individuals with zero schooling, it is presumed that they entered the labor
market at age 14, and hence potential experience has been calculated as
.5EXPp age 14
Table 3 (table 4) presents the means and standard deviations of the variables
used in the participation equation (earnings function) by gender separately for
5 My calculation of EXP tacitly assumes no grade repetition. The available data lack information
on grade repetition, containing information only on completed grades of school attainment. I
recognize that potential experience calculated in the aforementioned way is overestimated for
individuals who repeated grades while at school. Moreover, the cutoff age of 14 used to calculate
experience for illiterate individuals is based on the presumption that individuals enter the labor
market at 14 and can result in positive years of experience before age 14 for individuals with some
schooling but no such experience before age 14 for individuals with no schooling. However, the
coefficients of EXP and EXP2 are fairly robust to various specifications (including EXPp age 
completed grades of school attainment  5).
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TABLE 2
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES IN WAGE WORK PARTICIPATION/EARNINGS FUNCTIONS
Variable Description
PAID_EMPLOY Participation in salaried/waged work during the past month
AGE Age in years
AGE2 Square of age
HEAD Head of the household? yes p 1, no p 0
MARRIED Married? yes p 1, no p 0
LNUNEARNED_Y Natural log of unearned income (income from boarders/lodgers, zakat, re-
mittances, pensions, gifts and insurance, etc.)
CHILD7 Number of children aged 7 or less in the household
ADULT60 Number of adults aged 60 or above in the household
NO_EDUCATION Equals 1 if individual reports 0 years of education, 0 otherwise
LESS_PRIMARY Individual has completed less than 5 years of education (katchi class, 1, 2,
3, or 4 years); equals 1 if has completed less than primary and equals 0
otherwise
PRIMARY Equals 1 if individual has completed 5 years, 0 otherwise
MIDDLE Equals 1 if individual has completed 6, 7, or 8 years, 0 otherwise
MATRIC Equals 1 if individual has completed 9 or 10 years, 0 otherwise
INTER Equals 1 if individual has completed 11 or 12 years, 0 otherwise
BACHELORS Equals 1 if individual has completed 13 or 14 years, 0 otherwise
MA_MORE Equals 1 if individual has completed 15 years of education or more, 0
otherwise
SINDH Province is Sindh, yes p 1, no p 0
NWFP Province is North-West Frontier Province, yes p 1, no p 0
BALOCHISTAN Province is Balochistan, yes p 1, no p0
AJK Province is Azad Jammu and Kashmir, yes p 1, no p 0
NORTH Northern areas, yes p 1, no p 0
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas, yes p 1, no p 0
URBAN Region is urban, yes p 1, no p 0
LAMBDA Selectivity term, inverse of Mills ratio
LN_MONTHLY_Y Natural log of monthly earnings (rupees) of individuals in paid employment
in the labor market
EXP Experience (years)
EXP2 Square of experience
EDU_YRS Number of years of education acquired
EDU_YRS2 Square of years of education
FEDYRS Father’s education (years)
MEDPRIM Mother’s education primary or less equals 1 if mother has positive but less
than or equal to primary education, 0 otherwise
MEDPRIMORE Mother’s education more than primary equals 1 if mother has more than
primary education, 0 otherwise
SPOUSE_EDU Spouse’s (husband’s/wife’s) education (years)
READ Equals 1 if individual can “read in any language with understanding,” 0
otherwise
WRITE Equals 1 if individual can “write in any language with understanding,” 0
otherwise
MATHS Equals 1 if individual can “solve simple (plus/minus) sums,” 0 otherwise
PRIVATE Equals 1 if individual attended private school in the past, 0 otherwise
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TABLE 4
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES USED IN EARNINGS FUNCTIONS (AGED 15–60) IN WAGED WORK
Average Value of Variable Males N Females N
t-Test
(M  F)
LN_MONTHLY_Y 7.783
(.01)
11,501 6.284
(.03)
2,018 66.68
EXP 20.492
(.12)
11,501 20.097
(12.79)
2,018 1.30
EXP2 577.429
(5.98)
11,501 567.414
(14.09)
2,018 .65
EDU_YRS 5.666
(.05)
11,501 4.326
(.13)
2,018 10.32
EDU_YRS2 60.295
(.70)
11,501 51.925
(1.82)
2,018 4.53
NO_EDUCATION .361
(.00)
11,501 .581
(.01)
2,018 18.92
LESS_PRIMARY .079
(.00)
11,501 .039
(.00)
2,018 6.42
PRIMARY .097
(.00)
11,501 .052
(.00)
2,018 6.57
MIDDLE .122
(.00)
11,501 .039
(.00)
2,018 11.12
MATRIC .169
(.00)
11,501 .100
(.01)
2,018 7.78
INTER .065
(.00)
11,501 .062
(.01)
2,018 .58
BACHELORS .058
(.00)
11,501 .070
(.01)
2,018 2.16
MA_MORE .050
(.00)
11,501 .058
(.01)
2,018 1.58
FEDYRS 2.865
(4.19)
4,155 4.380
(4.91)
493 7.78
MEDPRIM .057
(.00)
4,155 .075
(.01)
493 1.65
MEDPRIMORE .040
(.00)
4,155 .061
(.01)
493 2.21
SPOUSE_EDU 2.059
(.05)
5,638 4.559
(.17)
943 16.68
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses beneath the mean values of the variables. Descriptive statistics
are computed excluding any individuals in paid employment who are currently enrolled in school.
NO_EDUCATION is the reference category for education splines.
wage work participants and nonparticipants. Table 4 shows that in waged
employment, males earn very substantially more than females. In logs, male
earnings are 24% higher than female earnings. The disparity in earnings is
more apparent from table 5, which shows average monthly earnings of waged
employees by gender and education level. At all education levels, male earnings
are significantly greater than female earnings.
IV. Econometric Results
Earnings functions are estimated using four methods: (1) OLS, (2) the Heckman
two-step procedure, (3) 2SLS, and (4) household fixed effects. The results are
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TABLE 5
AVERAGE MONTHLY EARNINGS OF WAGE EMPLOYEES, BY EDUCATION LEVEL AND GENDER
Education Level
Male
(1)
Female
(2)
Gap (M  F)
(3 p 1  2)
t-Test
(M  F)
(4)
F/M
(5 p 2/1)
NO_EDUCATION 2,271.5
(19.04)
581.3
(23.14)
1,690.2 44.62 .26
LESS_PRIMARY 2,258.7
(46.52)
732.1
(118.16)
1,526.6 9.40 .32
PRIMARY 2,539.7
(52.28)
709.0
(91.71)
1,830.7 10.54 .28
MIDDLE 2,599.0
(43.23)
1,054.0
(154.01)
1,545.0 8.26 .41
MATRIC 3,242.5
(45.00)
2,127.5
(127.57)
1,115.0 7.67 .66
INTER 4,109.6
(100.11)
2,512.9
(163.71)
1,597.7 6.27 .61
BACHELORS 5,845.0
(165.40)
3,818.5
(245.64)
2,026.5 5.39 .65
MA_MORE 8,521.9
(282.55)
6,518.3
(301.11)
2,003.6 3.13 .76
All 3,136.3
(26.41)
1,456.8
(48.50)
1,664.7 25.25 .46
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses beneath the mean values of the variables.
divided into two subsections. Subsection A presents OLS, Heckman, 2SLS,
and fixed-effects estimates of earning functions. Subsection B extends the
analysis by relaxing the restrictive assumption of linearity in the “years” spec-
ification, introducing occupation and industry controls and, finally, decom-
posing the gender wage gap using Oaxaca’s (1973) method. Equations are
fitted separately on males and females aged 15–65 in wage employment (except
in the household fixed effects models).
A. Earnings Functions
OLS and Sample Selectivity Bias (SSB) Estimates
OLS estimates of returns to schooling attainment are presented in table 6.
Columns 1 and 3 report findings for “grades” of education (EDU_YRS). Col-
umns 2 and 4 depict results for education “levels.” Focus on columns 1 and
3 first. The key parameter of interest is the point estimate on EDU_YRS—
the rate of return to an additional completed grade of schooling. The marginal
rate of return to schooling is 7.2% for males and 16.6% for females. The
return to schooling attainment for women is more than double that for men
in Pakistan. A Wald test confirms that the two coefficients on EDU_YRS in
columns 1 and 3 are statistically very significantly different. This baseline
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TABLE 6
OLS MINCERIAN EARNINGS FUNCTIONS (MALES AND FEMALES), WITH YEARS OF EDUCATION
AND LEVELS OF EDUCATION
Variable
Males (15–65) Females (15–65)
Years
(1)
Levels
(2)
Years
(3)
Levels
(4)
CONSTANT 6.223***
(.03)
6.357***
(.03)
4.188***
(.12)
4.307***
(.13)
EDU_YRS .072***
(.00)
… .166***
(.01)
…
EXP .076***
(.00)
.075***
(.00)
.073***
(.01)
.068***
(.01)
EXP2 .001***
(.00)
.001***
(.00)
.001***
(.00)
.001***
(.00)
LESS_PRIMARY … .011
(.03)
… .334**
(.14)
PRIMARY … .136***
(.02)
… .342**
(.13)
MIDDLE … .271***
(.02)
… .958***
(.14)
MATRIC … .534***
(.02)
… 1.505***
(.12)
INTER … .762***
(.03)
… 1.843***
(.12)
BACHELORS … 1.070***
(.03)
… 2.294***
(.11)
MA_MORE … 1.371***
(.03)
… 2.909***
(.11)
SINDH .205***
(.02)
.188***
(.02)
.281***
(.09)
.269***
(.09)
NWFP .060**
(.03)
.078***
(.03)
.494***
(.11)
.479***
(.11)
BALOCHISTAN .423***
(.03)
.386***
(.03)
.664***
(.13)
.643***
(.13)
AJK .165***
(.04)
.174***
(.04)
.711***
(.14)
.681***
(.15)
NORTH .216***
(.05)
.204***
(.05)
1.370***
(.32)
1.392***
(.32)
FATA .124**
(.06)
.096
(.06)
… …
URBAN .200***
(.02)
.204***
(.02)
.487***
(.09)
.503***
(.09)
2R .388 .408 .472 .478
N 11,501 11,501 2,018 2,018
Mean (dependent
variable) 7.783 7.783 6.284 6.284
Note. The dependent variable is LN_MONTHLY_Y. Standard errors are in parentheses. Ellipses indicate
no observations. NO_EDUCATION is the reference category for education splines and PUNJAB for
provinces.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
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TABLE 7
RATES OF RETURNS TO ADDITIONAL YEARS OF EDUCATION
(MALES AND FEMALES) AT VARIOUS LEVELS OF EDUCATION
Level of Education
Rates of Return (%)
Males Females
PRIMARY 2.7 6.8
MIDDLE 4.5 20.5
MATRIC 13.2 27.4
INTER 11.4 16.9
BACHELORS 15.4 22.6
MA_MORE 15.1 30.7
result implies large and significant gender differences in returns to schooling
attainment in Pakistan.6
Turn now to columns 2 and 4 for the levels specification. This model relaxes
the assumption of linearity of education implicit in columns 1 and 3. Some
striking findings emerge. First, the coefficients on education levels are positive
and progressively increasing with higher levels of education for both genders,
indicating a convex relationship between education and earnings. Second, the
coefficients at all education levels are significantly higher for females than for
males. The returns to additional years of schooling attainment at various levels
have been calculated using the coefficient estimates in table 6 and are reported
in table 7.7 The findings show that returns to female attainment are always
higher than returns to male attainment. However, while returns increase for
both males and females till INTER, they decline and then increase again at
higher education levels for both genders, but more for females than for males.8
Third, the increase in coefficients with education levels is much sharper for
women than for men, suggesting that the earnings profile is more convex for
females than for males. Finally, there is a premium in returns from PRIMARY
6 The sample of 15–65-year-olds includes a very wide age range of individuals. As Pakistan has
undergone a significant transformation in schooling for when different cohorts were attending
school, I divide the sample of individuals into two cohorts: individuals aged 15–35 and those aged
36–65. The coefficients on the OLS estimates for males in the two cohorts are 0.073 and 0.067
and for females are 0.17 and 0.17, respectively. This suggests that private wage returns to schooling
attainment are not significantly different across the two cohorts. Also, one wonders what the selection
implications are of excluding full-time students from the sample. I also reestimated the earnings
function on a subsample of individuals aged 25–65 with the view that by age 25 a very large
proportion of individuals have exited school. The estimated returns do not change for both males
and females.
7 The coefficients in the levels specification in table 6 have to be transformed to arrive at the
“returns.” The reason is that the number of years of education is different for the various levels of
education indicated by the dummy variables, and as measured here, the wage premia for a graduate
of a higher level include the premium from a lower level of education.
8 The dip in returns between MATRIC and INTER is significant for males and females, whereas
the increase between INTER and BACHELORS is significant for males but insignificant for females.
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to MIDDLE for females (coefficients increase from 0.34 to 0.96), with the
increase being substantially smaller for males (0.14 to 0.27).
However, as described before, OLS estimates may be biased because of sample
selection and endogenous schooling. Let us turn next to the SSB estimates (table
8), which correct for selection bias by using the Heckman two-step procedure
and incorporate LAMBDA into earnings function estimates.9 The selectivity-
corrected earnings functions reported in table 8 include the standard variables:
education, experience and its square, and the provincial and regional dummies.
Household demographic variables (CHILD7, ADULT60), marital status (MAR-
RIED), and LNUNEARNED_Y (table 6) are used as exclusion restrictions.
These variables are believed to determine participation in waged work but do
not directly affect labor market earnings. The identifying variables are jointly
significant at the 0.1% level (p-value of the F-test is 0.000) as well as individually
significant.
The LAMBDA term is large and statistically significantly negative for males
(in both years and levels specifications) and significant for females only in the
years specification. This would be consistent with more able, entrepreneurial,
and motivated persons being less likely to be waged workers. A comparison
across columns 1 and 3 and across columns 2 and 4 in tables 6 and 8 reveals
the effect of correcting for sample selection. Inclusion of the LAMBDA term
reduces the point estimates on years of education from 7.2% to 6.4% for males
and 16.6% to 14.2% for females. These differences in coefficients on EDU_YRS
across the OLS and SSB specifications are statistically significant for males and
females. In the levels specification, the inclusion of the LAMBDA term has
no significant attenuating effect on the education coefficients in the female
sample (consistent with LAMBDA being insignificant), but in the male sample
inclusion of LAMBDA has a significantly attenuating effect on some education-
level coefficients (BACHELORS and MA_MORE). Finally, specifying edu-
cation in levels rather than as EDU_YRS has an attenuating effect on the
point estimate of LAMBDA, which falls by a larger absolute value for females
than for males. The change in LAMBDA coefficients is significant for males
but insignificant for females. Overall, these findings suggest that OLS over-
estimates the return to education (especially in the years specification).
It is important, however, that the return to female schooling attainment
remains significantly greater than that for males even after controlling for
selection bias: the marginal return to schooling is 6.4% for males and 14.2%
9 The probit wage work participation first-stage regressions underlying the Heckman two-step
procedure are suppressed because of space limitations. Results are available from the author on
request.
763
TABLE 8
HECKMAN-CORRECTED MINCERIAN EARNINGS FUNCTIONS (MALES AND FEMALES), YEARS OF
EDUCATION AND LEVELS OF EDUCATION
Variable
Males (15–65) Females (15–65)
Years
(1)
Levels
(2)
Years
(3)
Levels
(4)
CONSTANT 7.295***
(.08)
6.908***
(.08)
5.227***
(.29)
4.310***
(.46)
EDU_YRS .064***
(.00)
… .142***
(.01)
…
EXP .049***
(.00)
.060***
(.00)
.062***
(.01)
.068***
(.01)
EXP2 .001***
(.00)
.001***
(.00)
.001***
(.00)
.001***
(.00)
LESS_PRIMARY … .020
(.02)
… .334***
(.13)
PRIMARY … .149***
(.02)
… .343***
(.12)
MIDDLE … .283***
(.02)
… .958***
(.14)
MATRIC … .533***
(.02)
… 1.504***
(.10)
INTER … .732***
(.03)
… 1.842***
(.15)
BACHELORS … .991***
(.03)
… 2.293***
(.18)
MA_MORE … 1.246***
(.03)
… 2.908***
(.28)
SINDH .085***
(.02)
.127***
(.02)
.239***
(.06)
.269***
(.06)
NWFP .053**
(.02)
.070***
(.02)
.695***
(.11)
.479***
(.14)
BALOCHISTAN .257***
(.02)
.303***
(.02)
.778***
(.10)
.643***
(.11)
AJK .062
(.04)
.117***
(.04)
.848***
(.17)
.681***
(.17)
NORTH .567***
(.06)
.395***
(.06)
1.786***
(.37)
1.393***
(.40)
FATA .160***
(.06)
.122**
(.05)
… …
URBAN .027***
(.02)
.111***
(.02)
.443***
(.06)
.503***
(.06)
LAMBDA .756***
(.05)
.407***
(.05)
.472***
(.12)
.001
(.22)
N (uncensored) 11,501 11,501 2,018 2,018
Wald x2 3,836.09 5,144.57 1,297.56 1,901.26
p-value (Wald) .000 .000 .000 .000
Note. The dependent variable is LN_MONTHLY_Y. Standard errors are in parentheses. Ellipses in-
dicate no observations. NO_EDUCATION is the reference category for education splines, and PUN-
JAB for provinces.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
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for females (cols. 1 and 3 in table 8). As with simple OLS, the return to
education for women is more than double that for men in Pakistan. This
difference is statistically significant. The results in the levels specification
reported in columns 2 and 4 are consistent with the OLS findings. Note that
the jump in coefficients from PRIMARY to MIDDLE remains even after
controlling for selection into waged work.
IV Estimates
However, OLS estimates of returns to schooling may suffer from endogeneity
bias. The SSB estimates reported above may also be biased upward because of
the classic “ability bias.” IV estimates are more robust than OLS and SSB
estimates on two counts: (1) they control for endogeneity of EDU_YRS, thereby
correcting for any upward “ability biases”; and (2) they are unaffected by
measurement error so that the reported findings should be purged of any
attenuating effects.
I use parental education as instruments for the subset of individuals reporting
father’s and mother’s education and alternatively spouse’s education as an
instrument for another subset of married wage workers. Education is instru-
mented using three variables: FEDYRS (years of education completed by
worker’s father), MEDPRIM (equals one if mother has completed any year of
primary education, zero otherwise), and MEDPRIMORE (equals one if mother
has completed more than primary education, zero otherwise).10 Mothers re-
porting no education (MEDNONE) are the omitted category. Parental edu-
cation may be good instruments for own schooling if parents’ education pos-
itively affects schooling but is not correlated with child ability (which is in
the error term of the earnings function), that is, assuming no intergenerational
transmission of ability.11 In the sample of wage workers aged 15–65 from the
PIHS (2001–2), between 24% and 26% of the variation in education of males
and females, respectively, is explained by father’s education.12 It is important
to note, however, that since parental education information is available only
10 I experimented with a number of instruments for mother’s education. The set of instruments
that satisfied the overidentification (OID) test and seemed justifiable and theoretically plausible
was chosen.
11 Even assuming no intergenerational transmission of ability, these instruments may still be
criticized on the grounds that parental education may have either a direct effect on individual
earnings in the labor market (nepotism and family connections) or an indirect effect through its
effect on school quality. These arguments make a case for including parental education as control
variables in earnings functions rather than using them as instruments for schooling.
12 I also have data on maternal education for a subset of workers. However, the correlation between
mother’s education and own education is relatively low (7% and 15% for males and females,
respectively).
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for those individuals whose parents reside in that household, this clearly non-
random process generates sample selection constraints. Moreover, IV estimates
are based on selected subsamples of subsets of individuals reporting earnings
in waged work.13
The IV analysis using parental background is augmented using spouse’s
education (SPOUSE_EDU p years of education completed by spouse) as
another instrument to compare the findings with parental education estimates.
This draws on the theory of assortative mating (Weiss 1999): individuals with
common social backgrounds, religion, race, and caste are more likely to bond
together in marriage. This is accentuated by the high correlation between
spouse’s education and own education in Pakistan (0.29 for males and 0.51
for females from the 2002 PIHS). Moreover, as social norms in Pakistan are
such that almost all individuals above a certain age are most likely to be
married, spouse’s education as an instrument is less likely to be problematic
than parental education.14
To determine the empirical validity of the instruments, turn to the first-
stage estimates reported in columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 in table 9. For both genders,
the first-stage equations reveal that FEDYRS, MEDPRIM, MEDPRIMORE,
and SPOUSE_EDU almost always have large, very precisely determined co-
efficients with the expected signs. The relevance of the instruments can be
assessed by examining the significance of the excluded instruments in the first-
stage IV regressions (Bound, Jaegar, and Baker 1995). The p-values of the F-
tests in the first-stage regression indicate that the instruments satisfy the
relevance condition very well. If the instruments used are not “valid,” that is,
if , the IV estimates will be inconsistent. The only way toCorr(Z ,  )( 0i i
13 I also corrected the IV estimates for sample selection (into wage work). This was done following
the approach outlined in Wooldridge (2002). The idea is to use the same set of instruments in
the selection and instrumenting regressions (Z1 and Z2). In the first stage, the probit regression
(for waged work) was estimated including all exogenous variables (i.e., including parental education,
Z1 and Z2, but excluding EDU_YRS). The earnings regression was estimated on controls Z1,
EDU_YRS, and the Mills ratio, using as instruments the controls Z1, Mills ratio, and instrumental
variables Z2. The coefficient on EDU_YRS for the male subsample from this regression was highly
statistically significant and equaled 0.090. The p-value of the OID test was 0.10. For the female
subsample, the coefficient on EDU_YRS was 0.164 and was highly significant, and the p-value of
the OID test was 0.33. These estimates are reported in app. table A1.
14 Using spouse’s education may raise the concern that as using this variable implicitly conditions
on marital status, and because marital status may be endogenous, the validity of this variable as
an instrument is reduced. However, this is unlikely to be the case in Pakistan because marriage
is dictated more by social norms than by individual choice and a vast proportion of adults in
Pakistan are married. For instance, almost 91% of individuals aged 30–50 in Pakistan are married.
However, spouse’s education may not be a good instrument if there is assortative mating on
unobserved endowments as reported in Behrman et al. (1994).
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assess the validity of the instruments is to have a surfeit of instruments and
use an OID test (Hansen’s J-test). This is possible only for the IV sample
using parental education since we have both mother’s and father’s education.
In both the male and female samples using parental education instruments,
the OID test confirms the validity of instruments used.
Table 9 reports 2SLS estimates. Education is specified as a continuous var-
iable.15 Columns 1–4 report IV estimates using parental education and
SPOUSE_EDU for males, and columns 5–8 report those for females. Columns
2, 4, 6, and 8 report first-stage results. Focus first on columns 1, 3, 6, and
7, the earnings functions estimates. The rate of return to an additional com-
pleted grade of school attainment is between 10% and 11% for males and
between 17% and 18% for females using either instrument. The main findings
are as follows: (1) as before, the rate of return to schooling attainment is always
higher for females than for males, and (2) consistent with the findings from
numerous other studies, bIV (10%–11% for males and 17%–18% for females)
is larger than bOLS (7% and 17% for females).
Household Fixed-Effects Estimates
Let us turn now to household fixed-effects (FE) estimates of returns to edu-
cation. The results are based on subsamples of at least one male and one female
wage worker within a household who are related in any way (e.g., father-
daughter, mother-son, brother-sister, or husband-wife) or are siblings (only
brother-sister pairs).16 Table 10 depicts the FE estimates: panel A for all re-
lations and panel B for sibling pairs. As before, education is measured in
“grades” and “levels.” The set of independent variables remains unchanged
with two exceptions. A gender dummy (MALE) is added since the sample
includes individuals of both sexes, and interaction terms (EDU_YRS_MALE
in grades and LESS_PRIMARY_MALE etc. in levels) are included. These
capture the effect of gender on the return to education. Finally, in panels A
and B, OLS estimates are reported along with FE estimates for comparative
reasons.
Focus first on the grades specification in panels A and B. The returns to
male education have been computed as the sum of the coefficients on
EDU_YRS and EDU_YRS_MALE. (For example, in panel A, the coefficient
on EDU_YRS is 0.14 and that on EDU_YRS_MALE is 0.082. The overall
return for males is the sum of 0.14 and 0.082, which equals 0.058, or
15 With few instruments per subsample, the levels specification cannot be used in 2SLS.
16 A caveat is in order: most women aged 20 and over are married and no longer reside with their
parents. This suggests that the FE sample (especially the subsample of brother-sister pairs) is a
select sample from the population.
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approximately 6%.) Thus, from FE estimates, the return to female schooling
attainment is clearly substantially higher than that to male attainment for all
individuals (14% for females compared to 6% for males) and for siblings (15%
vs. 11%, respectively).
Note that the FE point estimates on EDU_YRS and EDU_YRS_MALE
are lower than the OLS estimates, a finding consistent with previous literature.
However, although the FE estimates are lower, they do not collapse and are
reasonably close to the OLS estimates. Part of the decline in estimates could
be caused by an upward bias in the OLS estimator due to omitted variables.
Some part (albeit unmeasured) of the attenuation could be attributable to ME
if it is of the classical variety. Although studies such as Hertz (2003) that
correct for ME in within-household estimators still find the within-household
estimate of the return to education to be smaller than the corresponding OLS
estimate, the correction for ME causes a rise from the uncorrected estimate.
Data constraints prevent such a correction in the current study, but when a
majority of other studies have corrected for random ME, they have mostly
found estimates based on FE to be smaller than OLS estimates, which is also
what we find, and this gives us confidence in our findings.
Let us turn now to the levels specifications in panels A and B of table 10.
First, it is clear that, except for primary education, the FE returns to female
attainment are higher than those for males at all levels of completed levels of
schooling in panels A and B. This suggests larger labor market incentives for
females (than for males) to acquire education. Second, the FE findings confirm
that the convexity of the education-earnings profile in previous sections is not
an artifact of heterogeneity. Third, although evidence points to forb ! bFE OLS
a majority of cases in panel A, this is not true for siblings (panel B). Finally,
in both the all and siblings samples, the jump in returns from PRIMARY to
MIDDLE remains for females; for example, in the all sample, the coefficients
for females increase from 0.126 (PRIMARY) to 0.822 (MIDDLE), and those
for males are roughly the same for both levels of education (between 0.18 and
0.19).
Summary
Clearly, regardless of the methodology adopted, the results reveal similar find-
ings: the estimated marginal return to additional grades of completed schooling
is significantly higher for females than for males. The returns also increase
with higher levels of education, pointing to convex education-earnings profiles.
I also find that the labor market differentially rewards males and females with
relatively low education levels (primary and middle): women with middle
schooling are rewarded substantially more than women with primary education.
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This is not true for males. However, a number of issues warrant further in-
vestigation. The following subsections estimate extended earnings functions
to investigate the convexity of education-earnings profiles, analyze what factors
potentially drive the jump in returns from primary to middle schooling for
females and the lack thereof for males, and, finally, use the Oaxaca decom-
position method to determine whether there is differential treatment in the
labor market other than through differential rewards to education.
B. Extended Earnings Functions
Nonlinear Earnings Functions
So far, the continuous specification of the earnings function (grades) has assumed
linearity in schooling (captured in EDU_YRS). Theoretical literature suggests
that in fact the relationship between completed grades of schooling attainment
and earnings may be concave because of diminishing returns to education.
While there is empirical support for this concavity (Psacharopoulos and Pa-
trinos 2004), equally convincing evidence dating as far back as the early 1980s
suggests otherwise (Behrman and Wolfe 1984; Alderman and Sahn 1988). In
recent years, concavity of education-earnings profiles has been further chal-
lenged in studies that find returns increasing with higher levels of education,
that is, convex profiles (see Kingdon 1998; Card 1999; So¨derbom et al. 2004;
Belzil and Hansen 2002; Nasir 2002; Schultz 2004; Riboud et al. 2006). For
the purposes of this study, first, if the education-earnings profile is indeed
concave, imposing linearity as I have done in the continuous specification is
too restrictive. Second, documenting the shape of the education-earnings profile
is important because of its potential effect on the estimation of the relative
rates of return to schooling for women and men.
Using the levels specification, we have already found evidence of convex
earnings profiles for males and females with sharper convexities for the latter
than for the former. However, as OLS and SSB results in tables 6 and 8 do
not control for endogeneity within the levels framework, one wonders whether
the finding of convexity is an artifact of endogeneity. Although the FE estimates
also reveal sharply convex earnings profiles for males and females, they are
based on smaller samples. Hence, this subsection introduces a quadratic term
for years of education (EDU_YRS2) within the grades specification to relax
the linearity constraint previously imposed.
The endogeneity of EDU_YRS and EDU_YRS2 is tackled using a two-
stage control function approach. The main advantage of this approach is that
it allows one to control for the endogeneity of a nonlinear variable while
simultaneously testing for endogeneity: if the residual term from the first stage
is significant, it implies that the unexplained variation in EDU_YRS also
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TABLE 11
MARGINAL RETURNS TO EDUCATION (OLS AND CF)
Years of Education
Males Females
OLS
(1)
CF
(2)
OLS
(3)
CF
(4)
6 7.1 7.9 12.8 12.9
10 11.9 11.9 18.4 18.5
12 14.3 13.9 21.2 21.3
14 16.7 15.9 24.0 24.1
affects variation in earnings, and the insignificance of the residual term means
that one can accept the hypothesis that the schooling variable is not endog-
enous.17
Control function (CF) models can be estimated only on subsamples of in-
dividuals reporting parental education, and for comparative purposes, corre-
sponding OLS estimates are reported on the same subsamples. In the first
stage of CF estimation, parental education significantly positively determines
the completed grades of school attainment of an individual. However, the effect
is stronger for females: mother’s education (MEDPRIM and MEDPRIMORE)
is significantly positive only in the female sample, and the size of the coefficient
is double that in the male sample.
It is important to note that the earnings functions estimated incorporating
the residuals from the first stage show that even after we control for endogeneity
of schooling, the education-earnings profiles for males and females remain
convex. Table 11 computes the marginal return to schooling for various years
of completed schooling using the OLS and CF estimates and confirms the
convexity of the education-earnings profiles. A comparison of OLS and CF
estimates reveals that in most cases they are not significantly different from
each other. Consequently, in the extensions that follow, I report only OLS and/
or SSB estimates.
What Explains the Premium to Women with Middle Education?
Notice in tables 6, 8, and 10 that (1) the returns to low levels of education
were high especially for women, and (2) there was a large premium to women
for possession of middle-level education and the premium was greater than
that for men. One wonders what the labor market realities underlying this
result are. One possibility is that women’s higher economic benefits from
education are realized through better occupational attainment or better in-
dustry attachment. In order to test this, I include industry and occupation
17 CF estimates are not reported because of space constraints. Tables are available from the author
on request.
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dummies in earnings functions specifications.18 The results suggest that indeed
the effect of education on earnings occurs partly by permitting better occu-
pational attainment. The coefficients on OLS/SSB with occupation/industry
controls decline for both males and females. However, this is not the only
mechanism since there are large and significant direct returns to certain levels
of completed schooling (especially middle) even within occupations and in-
dustries. In particular, whereas for men education affects their earnings via
occupation/industry at all education levels, for women the effect of occupation
and industry association operates only after MATRIC.
Does the Labor Market Discriminate against Women?
In the Pakistani context, the finding that returns to completed grades of school
attainment are significantly greater for women than for men potentially raises
a puzzle as to why then parents allocate lower education to girls than to boys
(Aslam and Kingdon 2008). While it is empirically difficult to disentangle
the different reasons for education gender gaps (Alderman and King 1998),
one explanation could be that the total labor market return to boys is greater
than that to girls. This subsection extends the analysis in this way as a way
of probing parental motives further.
I decompose the male-female wage gaps using the technique proposed by
Oaxaca (1973). OLS and selectivity-corrected earnings functions (incorporating
EDU_YRS2) are estimated to predict earnings. The wage gap is decomposed
into two components: (1) that explained by differences in individual charac-
teristics and (2) the residual, unexplained portion, reflecting differences in
earnings structure. Using this method, one can decompose the total gender
wage gap into the explained and unexplained components. The unexplained
component could be seen as the extent of “discrimination” in the labor market.
However, if there are important differences in the unobserved or unmeasured
characteristics of males and females, then the residual component cannot so
validly be termed “discrimination.” The Oaxaca decomposition is initially
conducted using OLS. As a robustness check, I repeat the exercise using a
household FE model on subsamples of at least two waged workers of each
gender in a given household.19
With OLS, expressed in natural logs, the gross gender wage difference is
1.49. When I standardize by male means, 0.25 of the 1.49 gender wage
difference is explained by better male characteristics (such as higher educational
attainment) and 1.25 of the gender wage gap remains unexplained. Conse-
quently, almost 84% of the gender wage gap is unexplained. Standardizing
18 Results are not reported because of space constraints but are available from the author on request.
19 Results are not reported because of space constraints.
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by female means suggests an even greater unexplained proportion (95%). The
household FE estimates show that an even larger proportion of the gender
wage gap is unexplained. Household FE estimates provide a cleaner test since
unobserved or unmeasured characteristic differences between males and females
within the family are likely to be much lower than across families, and the
large unexplained portion in the FE sample is indicative of high discrimination
in the labor market.
However, since male and female hours worked may partly account for the
large unexplained component of the gender wage gap, one should ideally
perform the decomposition including hours worked in the earnings function.
Although I do not have information on hours, I do have data on days worked
in the past month. However, mean days worked is very similar for males and
females, and including that variable in the OLS and FE regressions causes the
unexplained component to remain virtually unchanged (the unexplained por-
tion estimate is 88% in the OLS and 94% in the FE sample).
These estimates of the unexplained portion are large in comparison to in-
ternational estimates. For example, estimates of the unexplained portion of the
wage gap range between 1% and 5% in the United Kingdom (Zabalza and
Arrufat 1983), 12% in the United States (Choudhury 1993), and 35%–
45% in India (Kingdon and Unni 2001). However, previous estimates in
Pakistan range from 63% in 1979 (Ashraf and Ashraf 1993b) to 33% in
1985–86 (Ashraf and Ashraf 1993a) and between 86%–96% and 55%–77%
in 1993–94 (Siddiqui and Siddiqui 1998). Clearly, my findings are closest to
those of the last study, which is also the latest past study. The findings are
suggestive of a pernicious increase in the “unexplained portion” over time. If
viewed as discrimination, they would explain not only the low participation
of women in Pakistan’s labor markets but also the large differentials in in-
trahousehold education expenditure allocations within households (Aslam and
Kingdon 2008). However, these conclusions are subject to an important caveat:
the decomposition of the male-female earnings gap is based only on wage
earners in a conditional equation (conditional on being a wage earner).20
V. Conclusion
This study seeks an answer to the following question: Does the labor market
explain lower education of girls than of boys in Pakistan? If the labor market
20 The large unexplained component in such conditional equations could be partly due to the fact
that women’s participation is constrained by cultural factors. A decomposition of the male-female
earnings gap based on an “unconditional” sample would presumably yield a larger gender gap,
with the likelihood that productive characteristics (education, experience, etc.) explain a greater
proportion of the gap.
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rewards women less than men, scarce resources may be allocated efficiently
though inequitably within the household. This question is addressed by es-
timating returns to schooling attainment for males and females in wage em-
ployment in Pakistan using household data from 2002. Four methods are used
in an attempt to overcome limitations faced in conventional earnings function
analyses: (1) OLS, (2) the Heckman two-step procedure, (2) 2SLS, and (3)
household fixed effects. The findings from all four methods consistently point
to a sizable gender asymmetry in returns. Females have significantly higher
economic incentives to invest in education than males. The estimated return
to additional completed years of schooling attainment (EDU_YRS) ranges
between 7% and 11% for men and between 13% and 18% for women. By
this consideration, the labor market does not explain lower female schooling
in Pakistan. If anything, it suggests that there should be a profemale bias in
the household decision to educate. However, the Oaxaca decomposition sug-
gests a large element of potential gender discrimination in the Pakistan labor
market. While the return to schooling is considerably lower for men than for
women, total earnings are dramatically higher for men than for women. While
a large part of the male-female earnings differential is not explained by men’s
and women’s differing productive characteristics, one must be cautious in
interpreting the residual unexplained earnings differential as labor market
discrimination since certain unobserved but relevant characteristics of men and
women may not be controlled, such as their quality of schooling (men are
more likely than women to have attended private schools), and certain variables
may be measured with error, such as the years of labor market experience.
The coexistence of high returns to schooling attainment for women and
gender bias against them in household education decisions is a puzzle that
demands explanation. One potential explanation is that even if the return to
girls’ schooling attainment is higher than that to boys’ attainment, the part
of the return to daughters’ attainment accruing to parents may be much lower
than that accruing from a son’s. The 2002 PIHS shows that only 6% of adult
daughters aged over 21 reside in their parental homes, suggesting that a
majority are married and living with in-laws/husbands. Any returns from these
daughters’ schooling attainment would accrue to the in-laws or the husband
rather than to the parents. Thus, it would seem that part of the explanation
for this puzzle may lie in marriage market considerations. In order to investigate
this explanation further, one would need data on transfers received by parents
from their male and female offspring. Such data are, to my knowledge, not
available. A second explanation for promale education bias, despite such high
returns to female education, is that social norms in Pakistan dictate that elderly
parents live with their sons. As social security systems in Pakistan are more
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or less nonexistent, this means that parents invest in sons more as a means of
overcoming this flaw in the system. A third explanation for underinvestment
in girls’ schooling despite higher private returns to education could be that
the opportunity cost of schooling for girls may be higher than that for boys.
Finally, it may also be that powerful social and cultural (demand-side) factors—
such as conservatism of attitudes toward women’s education and their labor
market work—as well as supply-side constraints limit girls’ access to schools
and discourage enrollment despite high economic returns to education. The
2002 PIHS shows that school availability continues to be a constraint in rural
Pakistan: 34% of the sampled rural communities reported nonavailability of
a government girls’ primary school (whereas 15% reported no government
boys’ primary school). Also, many of the aforementioned factors operate si-
multaneously; for instance, safety concerns often prevent parents from sending
daughters to school, and the nonavailability of a single-sex school compounds
this constraint further.
Finally, it could be that my estimate of the return to schooling attainment
is misleadingly high because it is estimated on the small wage employment
sector whereas a relatively large proportion of women in Pakistan are self-
employed. Estimating the return to schooling accurately in self-employment
is difficult because earnings in self-employment contain a return to physical
capital as well and we do not have a good measure of physical capital in order
to enable us to isolate the pure return to human capital. Also note that my
estimates of private wage returns to schooling attainment for women are likely
to suffer even more from the biases associated with sample selection discussed
earlier because of the very low proportion of women participating in the wage
labor market. However, a recent study by Kingdon and So¨derbom (2007)
estimates the economic returns to schooling for men and women in wage
employment, agricultural self-employment, and nonagricultural self-employ-
ment and finds the returns to women’s schooling to be larger than those to
men’s in all occupations.
Hence, this study is unable to explicitly conclude why the gap in years of
schooling between males and females in Pakistan is so high despite the private
wage returns to schooling attainment favoring women. If we were to focus
only on gender differentials in the wage returns to education, we would con-
clude that women’s returns to attainment are higher than men’s and, if any-
thing, parents should be allocating more resources to girls than to boys. Since
we observe the opposite to be the case, this suggests that parents may have
objectives other than maximizing financial returns to family allocation of
resources. Given this, one may argue the case for examining social policies in
Pakistan that subsidize girls’ schooling until the time that family investment
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in schooling becomes relatively equal for boys and girls. If parents are un-
deremphasizing girls’ education because social security systems are lacking,
policies may be needed to overcome this institutional failure. Finally, if girls
are getting less schooling because the opportunity cost of school time in terms
of home production is too high, innovative policies such as night school and
monetary incentives may be needed to increase girls’ enrollments (Schultz
1995). Note that this study estimates only the private returns to education
whereas policy considerations are based also on social returns that include a
measure of costs and are, hence, always lower than private returns. The policy
implications associated with gender gaps in returns to education might change
if gender differentials in education funding reduce the gaps in social returns
to education between males and females.
This study also finds sharply convex education-earnings profiles for males
and females. These findings are robust to control function estimates. There
are several policy implications of convexity of the education-earnings profile.
First, the “higher returns at lower education levels” argument has often been
used to justify allocating funds to expand primary education. If indeed the
returns are greater at higher education levels, the economic efficiency rationale
for channeling these funds to primary education may be diluted. However,
this is not to say that all rationales for funding primary schooling are elim-
inated: there is a strong case for primary education in terms of its nonrated
returns and also in a rights-based perspective. In any case, the return to primary
education includes the benefit that it permits access to further, more lucrative,
levels of education. Although the education-earnings profiles in Pakistan are
convex, the returns to primary schooling are high compared to those of other
developing countries. This may reflect unmet demand within industry sectors
that need low-skilled labor, and policy makers may need to promote low-level
education as well as adopt policies that encourage these individuals to partic-
ipate in the labor market (especially women).
Second, and linked to the first, convexity has implications for increasing
education inequality. If private returns to schooling increase with higher ed-
ucation, poorer families who educate their children till only, say, primary
education will face lower returns whereas richer families who educate children
till higher education will reap higher returns. Consequently, the poor are
motivated to educate their children less and may also send to school only the
more able children, for whom returns are higher. Consequently, education and
earnings differentials may widen both across families and within families
(Schultz 2004).
Finally, I also find evidence of high wage premia to low education levels,
especially for women in Pakistan. These large and significant direct returns
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to women’s schooling attainment at primary and middle levels are not fully
explained by occupation and industry attainment and are interpreted to reflect
scarcity premia in labor markets.
Appendix
TABLE A1
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE EARNINGS FUNCTION ESTIMATES (PARENTAL EDUCATION) CONTROLLING FOR
SELECTION INTO WAGED WORK (MALES AND FEMALES)
Males (15–65) Females (15–65)
IV
(1)
First Stage
(2)
IV
(1)
First Stage
(2)
CONSTANT 5.164***
(.31)
74.762***
(.92)
3.777**
(1.48)
27.318***
(1.09)
EDU_YRS .090***
(.00)
… .164***
(.05)
…
EXP .120***
(.01)
2.916***
(.04)
.154***
(.04)
.676***
(.08)
EXP2 .002***
(.00)
.075*** .003***
(.00)
.012***
(.00)
SINDH .322***
(.05)
8.493***
(.17)
.258*
(.15)
1.377***
(.24)
NWFP .098**
(.04)
.162***
(.13)
.074
(.37)
5.975***
(.33)
BALOCHISTAN .589***
(.06)
9.611***
(.19)
.752**
(.31)
2.876***
(.56)
AJK .128*
(.08)
5.749***
(.21)
.136
(.24)
3.079***
(.57)
NORTH .041
(.10)
14.909***
(.43)
… …
FATA .051
(.08)
4.320***
(.51)
… …
URBAN .251***
(.05)
11.407***
(.19)
.360**
(.15)
.582**
(.29)
MARRIED .133***
(.03)
1.702***
(.10)
.274
(.20)
.309
(.63)
LNUNEARNED_Y .002
(.00)
.127***
(.01)
.013
(.01)
.067***
(.03)
CHILD7 .010
(.01)
1.557***
(.03)
.018
(.04)
.013
(.08)
ADULT60 .010
(.02)
1.590***
(.06)
.034
(.09)
.091
(.16)
IMR .587***
(.20)
48.355***
(.66)
.064
(.61)
11.125***
(.44)
FEDYRS … .801***
(.01)
… .147***
(.03)
MEDPRIM … 2.147***
(.15)
… 2.344***
(.32)
MEDPRIMORE … 3.250***
(.16)
… 3.164***
(.30)
2R .300 .843 .463 .874
N 4,155 4,155 493 493
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TABLE A1 (Continued )
Males (15–65) Females (15–65)
IV
(1)
First Stage
(2)
IV
(1)
First Stage
(2)
F-test of excluding
instruments … 1,623.22 … 78.34
p-value (F-test) … .000 … .000
OID test … 4.533 … 2.170
p-value (OID test) … .104 … .334
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust and corrected for clustering at the PSU level.
The dependent variable is LN_MONTHLY_Y. Ellipses indicate no observations or not used. PUNJAB is
the base category for provinces and MEDNONE (p 1 if mother has no education, 0 otherwise) is the
base for mothers’ educational dummies; MEDPRIM p 1 if mother has primary or less education (but
more than zero) and 0 otherwise; MEDPRIMORE p 1 if mother has more than primary education, 0
otherwise. IMR is the inverse Mills ratio estimated from selection probit separately for males and females.
* Significant at the 10% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
*** Significant at the 1% level.
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